Excerpt from A Formal Framework and Fundamental Results for Social AnalysisA postscript is added, where the existence of static social contract is shown to be an extension and generalization of Nash' 3 result that a finite game has an equilibrium point. Implications are suggested toward further research.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.