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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism

Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism in Bloomington, MN
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Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism
David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This viewaccording to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truthsis familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensivedefending Robust Realism against traditional objectionsit mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections.
The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed herethe argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism
David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This viewaccording to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truthsis familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns defensivedefending Robust Realism against traditional objectionsit mobilizes the original positive arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections.
The main underlying motivation for Robust Realism developed in the book is that no other metaethical view can vindicate our taking morality seriously. The positive arguments developed herethe argument from the deliberative indispensability of normative truths, and the argument from the moral implications of metaethical objectivity (or its absence)are thus arguments for Robust Realism that are sensitive to the underlying, pre-theoretical motivations for the view.