Risk in War: Using History to Inform a Common Method for Understanding and Communicating Risk in Joint Operations in Bloomington, MN

Today's military doctrine fails to provide commanders and staffs with a process to focus the exploration of risk in military operations. The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a better method for understanding, estimating, and communicating risk to ensure effective evaluation of potential hazards to operations.Building on civilian literature, current U.S. and Allied doctrine, and historical case studies, this thesis proposes a lexicon to enable a more meaningful understanding of risk terminology and to create a baseline for understanding and communicating risk. In a similar manner, this thesis develops a mental model for risk analysis to help planners examine the strategic and operational environment and better estimate the risk to proposed military operations. This methodology is similar to other mental processes utilized in joint operation planning, and provides a sound basis for estimating risk. U.S. doctrine must change to provide essential guidance and tools to equip commanders and staffs to develop worthwhile risk assessments to inform seniors and subordinates alike. This thesis proposes methods and processes to reach that objective.