This book examines the dynamics of oil and gas conflicts within the context of federalism in Canada, an older federation with broadly a decentralized institutional design governing oil and gas, and Nigeria, a newer federation with a largely centralized design. It traces resource ownership, control or regulation, and revenue sharing conflict processes over time, and provides a focused comparison of conflict over the role of oil in intergovernmental fiscal transfers in both countries. In so doing, the book provides a much-needed corrective to conventional, static notions of oil conflict as either violent or nonviolent outcomes by carefully analyzing the evolution and ebbs and flows of conflicts hidden within conflict patterns that appear to be self-reinforcing and entrenched. The book demonstrates that (de)centralization dynamics, especially the continuities and shifts in federal institutional (structural and ideational) rules about oil itself,are central to the concept of conflict dynamics. It highlights the endogenous processes of federal institutional development, and lends credence to the historical institutionalists’ emphasis on the entanglement of institutions in their own transformation. Yet, the book also reveals that conflict dynamics did not emerge solely from the initial "compromise" between federal and provincial/state actors regarding the allocation of competence over oil. The renegotiation and reinterpretation of these rules over time, which entails a redistribution of power/resources in response to historical temporalities and shocks, political agency, and changing socioeconomic realities, also generated unique patterns of conflict and conflict resolution within the federal institutional arenas.