Brute Facts

Brute facts are facts that don't have explanations. They are instrumental in our attempts to provide adequate justifications for other facts or phenomena. Brute facts inform many people's views about the structure of the world, and are part of philosophical interpretations in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. Yet, despite the considerable literature on explanation, the question of bruteness has been left largely unexamined. The chapters in address this gap in academic thought by exploring the central considerations which surround this topic. How can we draw a distinction between facts that can reasonably be thought of as brute and facts for which further explanation is possible? Can we explain something and gain understanding by appealing to brute facts? Is naturalism inconsistent with the existence of (non-physical) brute facts? Can modal facts be brute facts? Are emergent facts brute? This volume brings together contributions by authors who offer different answers to these questions. In presenting a range of different viewpoints on these matters, engages with major debates in contemporary philosophy concerning modality, naturalism, consciousness, reduction and explanation.