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All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes

All Politics Is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes in Bloomington, MN
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Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? Many observers think so. But in
All Politics Is Global
, Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, statesespecially the great powersstill dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests.
As Drezner shows, state size still matters. The great powersthe United States and the European Unionremain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies.
Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations.
All Politics Is Global
, Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, statesespecially the great powersstill dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests.
As Drezner shows, state size still matters. The great powersthe United States and the European Unionremain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies.
Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations.